Who is responsible for meat inspections




















AQL — Acceptable Quality Level, statistical sampling plan to determine the cleanliness of all carcasses processed. To assure that a previously acceptable cut, carcass or product has not become sour, rancid, tainted, spoiled or adulterated. All meats are thoroughly inspected in the country of origin and representative samples determined statistically are tested at the port of entry for cleanliness, labeling, water content, wholesomeness, net weight, and fat percentage.

The top eight countries for meat and poultry imports, Supervision of manufacturing procedures. Inspectors must be fully informed of recipes, manufacturing processes to prevent adulteration, false labeling and to assure sanitary handling. Once inspectors condemn an animal, a carcass, a cut or a product, it must be identified as U. Condemned and held under lock and key or in suitably marked containers and disposed of by:. This rule calls for:. The new provisions would be applied to imported as well as domestic beef, require positive E.

Also, S. In the second session, H. The measure follows reports that some firms were prohibiting those who bought their products from testing them to ensure they were free of pathogens; at issue, among other things, is who might be liable for such products if they are found to be contaminated.

As noted earlier, media reports appeared in late that raised questions about the safety of the meat being supplied to school meals programs.

One order reportedly tested positive for the Salmonell a strain that triggered the retail recall—and was rejected by USDA. However, it would have been prudent for the Department to reject the other three orders even though they did not produce positive test results, one food safety expert told the newspaper. On the other hand, the three lots that were not rejected were produced during production runs on days following those that the recalled beef was produced; the assembly lines are cleaned each night, making it very unlikely that the pathogen would have survived, he added.

A subsequent USA Today article observed that on the one hand, AMS's safety rules for school-bound meat and poultry are more stringent than the Department's presumably meaning FSIS's rules are for commercially marketed products.

On the other hand, the article asserted, many of the larger fast food and supermarket chains set testing and safety standards that are far higher than those required by AMS. For example, McDonald's, Burger King, and Costco test the ground beef they buy five to 10 times more frequently than the Department's tests for a typical production day. The New York Times reported on a separate case where E. The Times stated that the meat was diverted before it went into the program.

Although one of the company's facilities reportedly has been suspended from the school lunch buying program three times in three years, USDA again, presumably FSIS has allowed the facility to remain in production for other customers.

The Times article outlines the company's use of "a product made from beef that included fatty trimmings the industry once relegated to pet food and cooking oil. The challenge, according to the Time s , has been how to keep the ammonia levels high enough to kill the pathogens but not negatively affect the taste of the product.

Furthermore, the government reportedly did not require that the ammonia-treated meat be so labeled, because the government agreed with Beef Products' assertion that it was a processing agent and not an additive.

He observed that ground beef destined for schools must be tested for both Salmonella and E. Furthermore, suppliers must hold the product until tests confirm that samples are negative for the pathogens.

Marsden added that other provisions in the AMS purchasing program require that slaughter plants include at least two pathogen intervention steps and that carcasses themselves be tested regularly for E. However, he also reiterated the "potential weakness" in the program that he described in the USA Today article, namely what he called "an overreliance on microbiological test results. Currently, the Agriculture Secretary must go to the courts to obtain an order to seize and detain suspected contaminated products if a firm refuses to issue a recall voluntarily.

The GAO has criticized agencies' efforts to ensure that companies carry out recalls quickly and efficiently, particularly of products that may carry severe risk of illness. A GAO report concluded that the agencies do not know how well companies are carrying out recalls and are ineffectively tracking them.

As a result, most recalled items are not recovered and thus may be consumed, GAO reported. At past hearings, consumer and food safety advocacy groups have testified in favor of obtaining these new enforcement tools to improve food safety in general, and to strengthen USDA's enforcement of the new HACCP system in particular.

These groups have asserted that civil fines would serve as an effective deterrent and could be imposed more quickly than criminal penalties or the withdrawal of inspection.

They also have argued that the authority to assess civil penalties would permit USDA to take stronger—and more rapid—action against "bad actors," or those processors who persistently violate food safety standards. Food safety advocates argue that FSIS should have the authority to mandate product recalls as a backup guarantee in case voluntary recalls moved too slowly or were not comprehensive enough.

Meat and poultry industry trade associations have testified in opposition to granting USDA new enforcement powers. Both producers and processors argue that current authorities are sufficient and that only once has a plant refused to comply with USDA's recommendation to recall a suspected contaminated product.

Industry representatives have testified that USDA's current authority to withdraw inspection, thereby shutting down a plant, is a strong enough economic penalty to deter potential violators and punish so-called bad actors. Furthermore, they say, new enforcement powers would increase the potential for plants to suffer drastic financial losses from suspected contamination incidents that could ultimately be proven false.

It is also argued that voluntary procedures encourage cooperation between industry and its regulators, whereas mandatory recall authority might discourage it. Mandatory authority would foster a more adversarial system of mistrust and possible litigation, making recalls less rather than more effective, industry representatives argue.

In August , the consumer group Center for Science in the Public Interest CSPI began a national campaign to urge USDA to publicize the names of retail outlets where recalled meat has been distributed, so that consumers can learn more quickly whether they have purchased potentially contaminated products.

USDA and industry leaders have contended that distribution records are proprietary, and exempt from provisions of the Federal Freedom of Information Act; such information, they argue, should be limited mainly to public officials so that they can monitor recalls. However, in the March 7, , Federal Register , FSIS proposed posting on its website the names of retailers who have products subject to a voluntary recall. The lists cover retailers involved in the potentially most serious Class I recalls only.

Reviewing FSIS protocols for handling recalls following the Topps case see box, " Topps Recall " , USDA's OIG concluded that while the agency has improved its investigative and recall procedures, it still needed "a science-based sampling protocol to collect and analyze a representative sample of product at an establishment to conclude whether contamination occurred there.

In the Senate but not the House version of the omnibus farm bill H. The final conference substitute, enacted as P. Another conference provision requires meat and poultry establishments to prepare and maintain written recall plans. The proposed implementing rules for these two requirements were still in review at USDA in mid-September Several other bills to authorize mandatory recalls for meat and poultry products were introduced but not enacted in the th Congress.

The bills which also would mandate similar requirements for FDA-regulated products provide for hearing opportunities, among other related language. A bill with similar objectives also was introduced by Senator Udall S. Mandatory recall provisions have been incorporated into food safety legislation H.

Recalls imply the ability to quickly trace the movement of products. Some argue, for example, that improved traceability capabilities would have enabled USDA to determine the whereabouts of all related cattle of potential interest in the three U.

The traceability issue has also been debated in connection with protecting against agroterrorism; verifying the U. Supporters of animal ID and meat traceability point out that most major meat-exporting countries already have domestic animal ID systems.

However, following the domestic BSE case, the industry, USDA, and other professionals attempted to implement a universal, although not mandatory, national animal ID but not meat traceability system. However, this system was focused on animal disease control rather than on food safety objectives. Some Members of Congress are among those who believed the programs should be mandatory in order to achieve universal participation.

Although many producers themselves appear to be supportive, many also have expressed adamant opposition to the plan. Among other issues are cost, need for a mandatory rather than voluntary system, potential producer liability, and privacy of records. On February 5, , Secretary of Agriculture Vilsack announced that USDA was revising its approach to achieving a national capability for animal disease traceability.

The NAIS is to be abandoned. In its place USDA proposes a new approach that will allow individual states and tribal nations to chose their own degree of within-state animal identification ID and traceability for livestock populations. Under this revised focus, states may chose to have no mandatory animal ID and traceability capability, or to rely on existing ID systems already in place to fight brucellosis, tuberculosis, and other contagious animal diseases, or to develop their own version of a more detailed birth-to-market ID system as originally proposed under NAIS.

The flexibility is intended to allow each state to respond to its own producer needs and interests. However, under the proposed revision USDA will require that all animals moving in interstate commerce have a form of ID that allows traceability back to their originating states. Animal ID proposals were offered but not enacted in the th Congress.

For example, H. Several other bills establishing broader traceability programs would have applied to animal ID as well. Explanatory language to accompany the appropriation further directed APHIS "to make demonstrable progress" to implement the program, and to meet a number of specific objectives regarding hour traceback ability that were in the agency's traceability business plan.

The FY appropriation P. The conference report expressed concern that the lack of progress by APHIS in registering animal premises in the United States would prohibit APHIS from implementing an effective national animal ID system, and that such a system was needed for animal health and would benefit livestock markets.

The conference report stated further that, "[i]f significant progress is not made, the conferees will consider eliminating funding for the program. With regard to proposed authorizing legislation in the th Congress, the broader food traceability provisions of H. The bills also would authorize the Secretary to require records to be maintained and to provide access to them for purposes of traceability.

Traceability provisions have been incorporated into food safety legislation H. From time to time in the past, FSIS has had difficulty in sufficiently staffing its service obligations to the meat and poultry industries.

Usually a combination of factors causes these shortages, including new technologies that increase plant production speeds and volume, insufficient appropriated funds to hire additional inspectors at times of unexpected increases in demand for inspections, and problems in finding qualified people to work in dangerous or unpleasant environments or at remote locations.

These staffing problems were complicated somewhat by the addition of HACCP requirements on top of the traditional inspection duties. To ease funding pressures, most administrations over the past 20 years have proposed to charge the meat-packing industry new user fees sufficient to cover the entire cost, or at least a portion, of federal inspection services. FSIS has been authorized since to charge user fees for holiday and overtime inspections, and does so. The primary rationale for more extensive user fees has been that resources would then be adequate to hire new inspectors as necessary.

USDA economists estimate that the cost passed on to consumers from such a fee would be no more than one cent per pound. Meat industry and consumer groups have consistently opposed increased fees, arguing that food safety is a public health concern that merits taxpayer support.

These fees were not adopted by Congress, which also had opposed them when they were in the Administration's FY budget. As noted, the enacted omnibus P. For FY, the enacted appropriation P. Congressional consideration of the FY budget request was getting underway in March The explanatory statement accompanying the FY measure expressed "very serious concerns about contaminated foods from China," and called on USDA to submit a report to Congress on the safety implications of such changes and a plan of action to guarantee the safety of Chinese poultry product imports.

A final rule to allow certain processed poultry products to enter from China had been published by FSIS rule on April 24, The Chinese government in March strongly criticized the ban as a violation of trade rules and stated that it would challenge it in the World Trade Organization WTO.

It also pointed out that China had "imported , tons of chicken products from the United States last year, accounting for The House-passed FY appropriation for USDA would have continued the Chinese chicken prohibition; the Senate would have permitted such imports but only under specified conditions.

House-Senate conferees on the final measure enacted as P. More specifically, Section of the final measure states that funds cannot be used to implement the rule unless the Secretary of Agriculture formally notifies Congress that China will not receive any preferential consideration of any application to export poultry or poultry products to the United States; the Secretary will conduct audits of inspection systems and on-site reviews of slaughter and processing facilities, laboratories, and other control operations before any Chinese facilities are certified to ship products to the United States, and subsequently such audits and reviews will be conducted at least annually or more frequently if the Secretary determines it necessary ; there will be a "significantly increased level" of reinspections at U.

Furthermore, USDA must provide a report to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees within days and every days thereafter, indefinitely, that includes both initial and new actions taken to audit and review the Chinese system to ensure it meets sanitary standards equivalent to those of the United States, the level of port of entry reinspections being conducted on Chinese poultry imports, and a work plan incorporating any agreements between FSIS and the Chinese government regarding a U.

USDA also is to meet specified requirements spelled out in Section for notifying the public about audits and site reviews in China and lists of certified Chinese facilities. Many food safety advocates were supportive of the House appropriations language banning the poultry rule, arguing that China—the third leading foreign supplier of food and agricultural imports into the United States—lacks effective food safety protections, and that the rule was rushed into approval without an adequate safety evaluation.

Opponents of a ban, particularly those in the U. According to FSIS, "at least equal to" means "that the food safety and other consumer protection measures effected by a State program address the same issues addressed by the Federal FSIS program, and the results of the State's approach are to be at least as effective as those of the Federal program. However, under international law, food regulatory systems in exporting countries may employ sanitary measures that differ from those applied domestically by the importing country.

The United States makes determinations of equivalence by evaluating whether foreign food regulatory systems attain the appropriate level of protection provided by our domestic system.

Thus, while foreign food regulatory systems need not be identical to the U. As noted, federal law long prohibited state-inspected meat and poultry plants from shipping their products across state lines, a ban that many states and small plants have wanted to overturn. Limiting state-inspected products to intrastate commerce is unfair, these states and plants argued, because their programs must be, and are, "at least equal" to the federal system.

While state-inspected plants could not ship interstate, foreign plants operating under USDA-approved foreign programs, which must be "equivalent" to the U.

Those opposing state-inspected products in interstate commerce argued that state programs have not been required to have the same level of safety oversight as the federal, or even the foreign, plants. For example, foreign-processed products are subject to U. The opponents of interstate shipment note that a recent FSIS review, which had found all 28 state programs to be at least equal to the U. In the th Congress, Section of the enacted farm bill P.

This program is to supplement rather than replace the existing federal-state cooperative inspection program. In states that choose to participate, a federally employed coordinator would supervise state inspectors in plants that want to ship across state lines. Eligible plants are limited to those with 25 or fewer employees—except that plants with between 25 and 35 employees can apply for coverage within the first three years of enactment.

Other provisions prohibit federally inspected establishments from participation, establish a new technical assistance division to assist the states, and require periodic audits by USDA, among other things.

The new program, which reflects language in the Senate version of the farm bill, reportedly was developed as a compromise by those on both sides of the issue. It appears to be based in concept on the Talmadge-Aiken program see page 4. Some proponents of ending the interstate ban on state-inspected meat contended that the new language is overly restrictive, while those who supported the change countered that it provides appropriate safeguards. The farm bill required final rules to implement the new state program by December FSIS published, on September 16, , the proposed rules, with an initial day comment period.

Among other provisions, the proposed rule would prohibit a participating establishment from reverting to intrastate inspection if it fails to correct any violations of federal standards that are found. A final rule had not yet appeared as of mid-March Eighteen of them were cattle born in Canada, which reported its first native case in May and its latest case in March one earlier case was imported into Canada from Great Britain.

The United States reported its first case in December one of the Canadian-born animals, imported into the United States. The United States also found two additional cases, in U. The most recent U. The most recent Canadian case was announced by Canadian officials on March 10, , in a six-year-old beef cow in Alberta. In epidemiological investigations of the three U. Despite a beef recall, some meat from the first U.

BSE cow may have been consumed, USDA said, adding, however, that the highest-risk tissues never entered the food supply. No materials from the other two U. Animal health officials initially indicated that all of the North American cases were caused by the consumption of BSE-contaminated feed. If these cases are determined to be "spontaneous," that may affect future control strategies. After the first U.

BSE protection systems, effective immediately:. The FSIS actions, which remain in effect, were in addition to other BSE regulatory safeguards that have been in place for several years. Additional USDA actions in the wake of the December BSE discovery have included more attention to implementing a nationwide animal identification program that would enable all cattle and other animal movements to be traced within 48 hours in cases of animal disease see prior section on " Meat Traceability and Animal Identification " ; and an intensive, one-time BSE testing program for higher-risk cattle since completed.

Lay inspectors in the slaughter area are trained to carefully observe the slaughter procedures and to identify and retain carcasses or carcass parts that appear abnormal. In , 0. Therefore, while a HACCP plan for the processing facility alone would minimize hazards, it would not totally eliminate food hazards.

From the construction of pork processing facilities to the shipment of pork products from a plant, the FSIS-USDA is involved in every aspect of manufacturing wholesome meat products. An on-site FSIS-USDA inspector observes the hog before, during and after slaughter as well as during the processing of a carcass into smaller, value added pork products.

FSIS tests meat and meat products for residues and microbiological hazards and makes sure the food additives are used correctly and reported accurately on food labels.

Food safety and wholesomeness is the responsibility of everyone that comes into contact with a food from production to consumption. Stenhoim and Daniel S. Reference to products in this publication is not intended to be an endorsement to the exclusion of others which may be similar. Persons using such products assume responsibility for their use in accordance with current directions of the manufacturer. The information represented herein is believed to be accurate but is in no way guaranteed.

The authors, reviewers, and publishers assume no liability in connection with any use for the products discussed and make no warranty, expressed or implied, in that respect, nor can it be assumed that all safety measures are indicated herein or that additional measures may be required. The user therefore, must assume full responsibility, both as to persons and as to property, for the use of these materials including any which might be covered by patent.

This material may be available in alternative formats. Information developed for the Pork Information Gateway, a project of the U. Meat Inspection vs. Meat Grading is a voluntary service performed by the Agricultural Marketing Service AMS of the USDA, which segments carcasses and, in turn, meat products from those carcasses, into homogeneous groups based on factors that predict the taste appeal of cooked meat and the quantity yield of meat from carcasses.

In contrast, Meat Inspection is a mandatory program, conducted by the Food Safety and Inspection Service of the USDA, which oversees the production of safe and wholesome meat products for consumers.

As the representative of consumers in a processing plant, the FSIS meat inspector is responsible for oversight of sanitation and wholesomeness throughout the entire processing operation. The inspector examines the sanitary conditions and determines if facilities continue to meet specified building and equipment regulations. Antemortem Inspection All livestock offered for slaughter in a federally inspected processing facility must be examined on the premises of the establishment by a veterinarian or lay inspector under veterinary supervision on the day of, and prior to, slaughter.

The animal is observed both in motion and at rest, in order to identify any conditions that may raise questions as to its general health.



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